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Abstract. This paper introduces and explores the idea of data poi-
soning, a light-weight peer-architecture technique to inject faults into
Python programs. This method requires very small modification to the
original program, which facilitates evaluation of sensitivity of systems
that are prototyped or modeled in Python. We propose different fault
scenarios that can be injected to programs using data poisoning. We use
Dijkstra’s Self Stabilizing Ring Algorithm to illustrate the approach.
1 Introduction
Designing dependable software is notoriously hard. In designing critical systems,
designers should continuously evaluate the dependability of their design in the
presence of potential faults or failures. Fault injection tools emulate potential
problems in the environment that a system will operate within [5], by injecting
an error state into the running program. We note that given the traditional
meanings of fault, error, and failure in software testing, error injection is possibly
a better name for this method.
Broadly speaking, there are two primary fault injection techniques: hardware-
based fault injection and software-based fault injection. In the first, additional
hardware is used to inject faults. This hardware introduces an error via contact
with a target circuit by changing voltage or current, or uses radiation or some
other physical phenomena to introduce a fault.
Software-based fault injection approaches use code instrumentation or run-
time injection. In the code instrumentation approach, additional code is inserted
into source code to emulate faults. In runtime injection, events in the compu-
tational environment such as interrupts and timeouts are used to introduce the
fault. In this paper, we introduce a software-based approach, called data poison-
ing, for fault injection exploiting dynamism in the dispatching mechanism of the
Python programming language for fault injection.
Python is a popular programming language for fast prototyping. There are
growing number of libraries in Python that help developers to prototype or
model system in Python: e.g., MyHDL for hardware design, SimPy for discrete
event simulation, Kairos [4] for programming sensor networks, and Pymote for
simulation of distributed algorithms.
The Python data model abstracts all data as objects [1]. It also simplifies
making changes in the basic behavior of objects. This flexible data model has
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Table 1. Notation Guide
Notation Meaning
∂(v) true, if v is poisoned,
false, otherwise
uses(S, v) true, if statement S uses v
false, otherwise
dev(S, v) true, if poisoned v that is used in S has manifested deviant behavior
false, otherwise
been utilized to create dynamic symbolic execution engines for Python [3,2], in
which concrete objects in the program are replaced with proxy objects that carry
out symbolic execution in addition to concrete computation.
Data poisoning exploits the flexibility of the Python data model to inject
faults with minimal source code changes and a degree of control over how faults
and injected and propagated that greatly exceeds that of traditional fault in-
jection tools. The contributions of this short paper are: (1) a definition of data
poisoning and (2) an implementation of data poisoning for Python.
2 Data Poisoning
In this section, we define data poisoning and provide some examples to clarify
the core concepts.
Table 1 shows the notation that we use in the remained of this paper. Suppose
a program Prog in SSA form. That is, all variables in Prog are assigned to
only once. Predicate uses(S, v) denotes whether statement S uses variable v.
For example, if s = velocity = v0 + acceleration*t and v =acceleration,
predicate uses(s, v) holds, because acceleration is used in S.
dev(S, v) denotes deviation in the behavior of an operator of a variable v in
statement S. For example, if the result of multiplication * in s is 1% more
than the correct value, dev(s, acceleration) holds. Note that dev(S, v) =⇒
uses(S, v).
Definition 1 (Data Poisoning) Variable v is poisoned, or ∂(v), if and only
if there is a statement s in Prog such that if s is executed long enough the
probability of dev(s, v) approaches 1.
3 Implementation
In this section, we describe the architecture for data poisoning. We also use an
example to illustrate data poisoning at work.
Figure 1 illustrates the peer architecture for data poisoning. Target objects
are replaced with corresponding poisoned proxy objects. Responsibility of proxy
objects is to receive program’s operator callbacks and depending on fault injec-
tion configurations process them.
3.1 Example
Fig. 1. Architecture
Self-stabilizing systems, when perturbed to an
error state, are able to converge to a non-error
state in a finite number of steps. Such systems
are of particular interest in distributed fault-
tolerant systems. Designing such systems is
not trivial and using fault injection can un-
cover problems in designs before designers at-
tempt to prove correctness of the design [7].
Dijkstra assumes a ring network with N+1
nodes numbered as 0, .., N . Each node can be
in one of K states, where K > N . In a non-
error state only one node has the privilege to
transition to a new state. The privilege can be
seen as a token in the system for performing
an action, and there must be only one token
at a time in the system; furthermore, all nodes
must eventually get the privilege. Making this system self-stabilizing means that
if at any time there are 0 or > 1 tokens in the system, they system should
eventually move to the state with only one token in the system. A fault injection
tool and rapid prototyping can help designers develop and refine such algorithms.
Suppose S shows the current state of a node i and L is the current state of
its left node, Dijkstra’s algorithm for this problem can be described as below:
n = 0 ∧ L = S =⇒ S = (S + 1)%K
n 6= 0 ∧ L 6= S =⇒ S = L
The key to understanding this algorithm is to observe the behavior of the algo-
rithm when the state of system is perturbed to an error state.
Figure 2 shows snippets of implementation of Dijkstra’s algorithm. The Node
class represents nodes. status shows the current status of an instance class of
Node. It is initialized to 0. Function update updates the status of the node
based on the algorithm. In update, whenever a node can make a transition
to new state, it obtains the privilege. To observe the state of the system, it
calls function out() from Network class. Network class contains a list of nodes
in the network. out returns a string that represent the state of all nodes in
the network. It gets the state of each node, by calling its MON hasPrivilege
function. Our tool considers the functions that their names start with MON as
the monitoring/reporting functions and disables the data poisoning in them.
Given the definition of class Node, one can write a small simulator as in
Figure 3. This simulator creates a network of size 5 and 10 times updates the
entire network. The result of this simulation is:
1,0,0,0,0
0,1,0,0,0
0,0,1,0,0
0,0,0,1,0
0,0,0,0,1
class Node:
nodecount = 0
def __init__(self):
self.status = 0 # Poison (0, size=1, rate =1, cascade=True)
self.nid = Node.nodecount
Node.nodecount += 1
self.privilege = False
def MON__hasPrivilege(self):
L = self.getLeft ()
S = self.status
if self.nid == 0:
return L == S
else:
return L != S
def update(self):
L = self.getLeft ()
S = self.status
self.privilege = False
if self.nid == 0 and L == S:
self.privilege = True
print(Network.out ())
self.privilege = False
self.status = (self.status + 1) % K
if self.nid != 0 and L != self.status:
self.privilege = True
print(Network.out ())
self.privilege = False
self.status = L
Fig. 2. Dijkstra’s Self-Stabilizing Algorithm
1,0,0,0,0
0,1,0,0,0
Each line in the output shows the overall states of nodes in the network. 1
denotes a node has privilege. In the absence of state perturbation the invariant
holds in this run. To inject faults with data poisoning, the designer only needs
to import the data poisoning library and replace one statement in Figure 2:
self.status = Poison(0, size=1, rate=1,cascade=True)
The Poison class implements data poisoning.
4 Different types of data poisoning.
The architecture of data poisoning facilitates fine-grained control of fault injec-
tion. In this secton, we describe three controllable dimensions of data poisoning.
We use Hoare triplets {P}S{Q} to define the semantics of data poisoning, where
{P} denotes predicates true before execution of statement S and {Q} denotes
predicates true after execution of S. S denotes basic expressions, i.e. assignment
expressions, or conditional expressions that are used in control-flow statements.
Determinism in Effect of Poisoning. Poisoned data may either always
deviate, or deviate with some probability.
NetworkSize = 5
SIMULATIONROUNDS =10
for i in range(NetworkSize ):
n = Node()
Network.add(n)
for i in range(SIMULATIONROUNDS ):
for nid in range(NetworkSize ):
Network.nodes[nid]. update ()
Fig. 3. Sample simulator
Definition 2 (Deterministic Effect Poisoning) ∀S : uses(S, v)∧ ∂(v) ∈ P =⇒
dev(S, v) ∈ Q.
Definition 3 (Intermittent Effect Poisoning) ∀S : uses(S, v)∧ ∂(v) ∧p ∈
P =⇒ dev(S, v) ∈ Q, where p is a predicate with a random Boolean value.
Lifetime of Poisoned Data. Poisoned data may either always be poisoned
or have a single (generalizable to finite counts) poisoning.
Definition 4 (Always Poisoned Data) ∀S : ∂(v) ∈ P =⇒ ∂(v) ∈ Q.
Definition 5 (Transiently Poisoned Data) ∀S : ∂(v) ∈ P ∧ uses(S, v) =⇒
¬ ∂(v) ∈ Q.
Infectiousness of Poisoned data. Poisoned data can be defined as infec-
tuous, causing poisoning for variables derived from its value, similar to tainting
[8,6].
Definition 6 (Infectious poisoning) For an assignment expression, x = u
binOp v: ∂(u) ∈ P∨ ∂(v) ∈ P =⇒ ∂(x) ∈ Q, where binOp is a binary opera-
tion.
Definition 7 (Non-infectious poisoning) For an assignment expression, x
= u binOp v: ∂(u) ∈ P∨ ∂(v) ∈ P¬ =⇒ ∂(x) ∈ Q, where binOp is a binary
operation.
if self.nid== 0:
self.status = Poison(0, infection_size =1, infection_rate =1,cascading=False)
else:
self.status = 0
Fig. 4. Non-infectious Transiently
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